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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
GLE·NDORA JACKSON,

Plaintiff ana Appellant,
vs.
ARTHUR LARRON COI~STON and
MARY A. ZUPO, doing business as
POSTURE-FORM STU·D;IO,

Case
No. 7199

Defendants and Respondents. 1

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT 0 F FACTS
1

The defendants, ArthlJr Larron Colston and Mary A.
Zupo, were partners operating a business in the Mcintyre
Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, under the name and style
of Posture-Form Studio (Tr. 18). They held the~ijselves out
as being able to assist in tissue rejuvenation, weight reduction, muscle and nerve relaxation, and further, that they
could aid and improve the movement and flexibility of joints
(Tr. 18). In such business for the purposes indicated they
used what is known as an infra-red lamp and also a "depolray" lamp. They charged $17.50 for thirteen treatments.
The first treatment was called a courtesy treatment; it was
to demonstrate the kind of treatments given (T'r. 19-207).
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Plaintiff went to the defendants because she was over
weight and further because she was having trouble with her
left ankle, which had been sprained some eight years before.
On March 18, 1946, plaintiff began the regular course
of treatments and received them two or three times a week
until almost the 15th of April, 1946. She was first placed
on what was called table No. 1 (Tr. 210) for a period of 20
minutes. This table had some kind of mechanical action
which massaged certain portions of the plaintiff's body. No
heat or lamps were applied to plaintiff's body on this table,
but she was given inhalations of oxygen. She was then
placed on table N·o. 2. another mechanical contraption which
massaged other portions of plaintiff'·s body. In connection
with this table, there was used what was called a "de-polray"
lamp (T'r. 211).
The "de-polray" lamp was a fake according to the testimony of "Doctor" Plumb, a witness for the defendantS,
which generated a very small amount of heat and simply
produced a magnet inside of the lamp that could pick up
small nails, hairpins, and things of that sort, and the small
magnetic force which emanated from the lamp could not
possibly have any effect on the human body (T'r. 2:58).
This lamp was placed about an inch from plaintiff's
left ankle and was left on for a period of 10 minutes (Tr.
212). After being on table No.2 for a period of 10 minutes
she was placed on table No. 3, which was another mechanical
table and which shook the entire body of the plaintiff. Onthis table another lamp was used which was placed approximately from 24 to 30 inches from plaintiff's ankle (Tr. 215).
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This third table was called "Sea Biscuit," the motion resembling that of the famous running horse of that name.
This lamp was larger than the one used in co~nection with
table No.2. It was called an infra-red lamp and was applied
for almost ten minutes.
At about the fifth treatment the plaintiff noticed that
her ankle was becoming inflamed, or as she described it,
"a flaming area." (P. 74.) The ankle became purplish red
and was very painful and she had to go back and forth in a
cab. She spoke to the attendant about it who told her, "You
always get worse before you get better." (P. 75.) She progressively got worse and in April, the heel broke open and
also the toes, the ankle had swollen to about twice the normal size and was very much inflamed and dark looking.
They continued to use the lamp which just produced a warm
comfortable feeling. In the last treatment received there
was a feeling of heat (P. 75).
She showed Mrs. Zupo the ankle and that defendant
stated that she would massage it, but plaintiff refused as
she was worried about its condition. By the time for the
eleventh treatment, about April 15·, 1946, her ankle had
become so painful and inflamed that she had great difficulty
in walking. Towards the latter part of May, 19'46, she called
a doctor (Tr. 85), who instructed her how to care for the
ankle. Other doctors later were also consulted concerning
the condition of plaintiff's ankle.
The following testimony of Doctor Ray T. Woolsey and
Doctor Alexander might be helpful to the court.
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Dr. Ray T·. Woolsey, one of the physicians who treated
plaintiff, testified that the plaintiff talked with him first
over the phone and then came to his office; that she was suf. .
fering from a discharging sore near the ankle (Tr. 105);
that he examined it and from the examination concluded that
she had been burned; that it would require a lot' of treatment; that he recommended that she see some surgeon for
an operation as he was confining his work to obstetrics and
gynecology. 'He recommended that she keep wet dressings
on it and wash, the burned area with some mild antiseptic;
that there had been a destruction of tissue around the sore
spot (Tr. 106) ; that it did not have the appearance of being
a flame burn; that there was nothing to indicate that it was
a flame burn. The Doctor then testified :
"Q. Doctor, are you familiar with burns from
electricity, from applying electric treatment, and
burns of that kind?

A. Not specifically. I know they produce a
definite-more or less a charring, not charring-the
tissues become white~ the circulation is destroyed
due to the action of the electric heat on the tissues.
Q. What would you say, in your opinion, whe ..
ther the electric heat could cause such a burn as you
saw?

A.

I think so, sir.

And if caused by electric heat, it is usually
quite a deep burn, deep into the tissues?
Q.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did this have that appearance deep in the

tissues?
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A. Yes, a deep hole in the tissues where it
sloughed out, and this hole was a quarter to half of
an inch deep then.
And burns of that kind, what would you say
as to whether or not in your opinion they are much
more difficult to heal than an ordinary burn from
flame?
Q.

A. There is no way of telling how deep it will
go, and when the tissues are destroyed from electric
heat of that kind, the tissues usually slough out, and
the only thing to do is wait until its sloughs out, until
you see 'vhat it is, and let the scar tissue fill the hole."
Dr. Alexander who also treated the plaintiff for the
burns testified that he first saw her in June of 1947. He
testified in part as follows :
"A. And on the left ankle there was a large
ulcerated sore, oh, I would say almost the size of _a
quarter, with two small other ulcerated areas in close
association with it, and around the whole ulceration
there was a reddened area, it was tender and swollen,
and very painful to the touch. And this area, in addition to the area of the sores, was about as large as a
dollar.
There seemed to be-there was considerable.
tenderness along the side of Mrs. Jackson's leg extending almost as far as the knee; she was unable to
bear any weight on it without having considerable
pain.''

* * *
I

"I inquired very carefully into the history of
Mrs. Jackson, she told me she had a series of treatments, electric heat treatments of some sort applied
to that ankle and I, after eliminating other possibili-
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ties which I didn't find responsible for it, came to
the conclusion the only thing that could cause it was
the electric treatments she had been subjected to.
And would electric treatments cause such a
condition?
Q.

A. Y'ies, if the electric treatment is too strong,
too continuous, or if it is applied too frequently
when the tissue is not of good nutrition."
·The defendants so far as the record shows had no training in medicine or the treatment of injuries or sickness. The
testimony of Mary Zupo is very illustrative. She had graduated from the South High school in 'Salt Lake City, and
following her graduation had taken a business course at
Henager Business College ; she then became an office secretary in an accounting office where she took shorthand and
typewriting. From there she went into the "Posture-Form
Studio" to give the treatments in question. She had never
had any training in medicine. The defendant, c·olston, who
was not present in court, instructed her how to give treatments and how to use the tables. She became his partner in
19·44. She ~ad made a self-study of dietetics, anatomy, and
physiology; that for a reducing diet they used a printed
pamphlet (Tr. 244) .
We are not interested in this appeal as to the extent
of plaintiff's injuries. The medical testimony, however, as
set forth above is very corroborative of plaintiff's evidence
that she suffered from electrical burns. Plaintiff continued
to receive medical treatment for her burns from May, 1947,
practically to the time of trial. That the lamp on table No.
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3 could burn can scarcely be denied. On one occasion, the
lamp caused the leather on the table to emit an odor because
of the heat (Tr. 80).
In addition to the plaintiff's testimony and the medical
testimony, 've have the admission by the defendant Zupo
that the defendants had burned plaintiff. During the month
of . .;.ugust,
.
1946, plaintiff went to the defendants' place of
business and there talked to the defendant Zupo concerning
her condition and showed her ankle to her. At that time the
defendant Zupo stated that they, the defendants, had burned
her (Tr. 89). It is undisputed that the lamps were under
the exclusive care of the defendants. None of the patrons
were allowed to operate the lamps, and the patrons were
not even allowed to get off a table without the aid and
assistance of defendi).nts (Tr. 73, 74, 216, 29·5-298). The
defendant Zupo, of course, denied that she told plaintiff that
she had been burned. The defendants also produced an
electrical engineer, a so called expert, who testified that he
believed that the lamps used could not burn anyone.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the defendants
each made a motion for a directed verdict of, "No cause of
action," (Tr. 333, 334). The court granted the motion
stating, "I am of the opinion that the jury could. do nothing
more than speculate as to the cause of the injuries that
the plaintiff suffered as far as this evidence is concerned."
(Tr. 3-34, 335.)
Within the time allQwed by law, the plaintiff duly filed a
motion for a new trial which was by the court denied.
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A statement of the errors upon which plaintiff relies
for a reversal of the judgment of the court below:
1. The Court erred in directing a verdict in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiff.
2. The Court erred in overruling and denying the
plaintiff's motion for a new triaL

ARGUMENT
Both of the above referred to specifications of error for
the purpose of this argument should be considered together.
The sole and only question we are concerned with here is
whether or not there was sufficient evidence adduced on
the part of the plaintiff to take the case to the jury. We
submit that in view of the plaintiff's statement that the
defendants admitted that they had burned her and that the
doctors who were caring for her were treating her for an
electricaJ burn, and that there was no evidence of the plaintiff ever having been burned, except at the defendants'
place of business, that the jury should have been allowed to
consider the matter and determine where the truth Ia~
\

'The testimony is undisputed that the lamps used by the
defendants were under their exclusive care and control and
that they were the only ones who operated or attempted to
operate them, and that at no time were the lamps operated
by the plaintiff; that on each occasion, it was the defendants
who placed the lamps upon and over plaintiff's ankles. In
view of the undisputed testimony that the lamps were under
the exclusive care of the defendants and that a burn would
not ordinarily result from the use of the lamps if they were
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operated properly, and which in the course of ordinary events
would not burn the plaintiff, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies.
That the ~octrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to
the case at bar is indicated by the following cases applied
to similar situations.
In Shauvin v. Krupin, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 322, 40 P. (2d)
904, the plaintiff while getting a permanent wave at defendant's beauty shop received a scalp burn. She brought an
action against the defendants alleging in general the acts
performed by the defendants in th~ course of their work. The
acts constituted the entire operation undertaken by defendants in which plaintiff might have received her injuries and
they were all charged to have been done in a negligent manner. In affirming the judgment the court said:
"It is a case in which the application of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine is imminently just and proper.
The devices used in the process were under the exclusive control of the defendants. The injury was
one which in the natural course of things would not
have occurred, had the defendants used due care,
and plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover, unless the defendant offered a satisfactory explanation
to overcome the presumptive evidence of their negligence."
·
In Higgins v. Byrnes, 274 Ala. App. 440, plaintiff went
to the defendant's beauty parlor to get a permanent wave.
She was burned by the apparatus. The court said that there
was no evidence that the apparatus used was defective and
that it followed that the injury to plaintiff was caused by the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
failure of the defendant's operator to use the necessary precautions to protect plaintiff's scalp, and this failure was
negligence.
See also

Pearson v. Butts (Iowa) 276 N. W. 65;
Davis v~ Graves, .250 Ky. 6.54, 63 S. W. (2d) 803;
Swedin v. Friedman, 9 La. App. 44, 118 So. 787;
Gavin v. Kluge, 275 Mass. 3'72, 17·6~ N. E. 193.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has also been held
applicable in cases involving the use of X-ray machines and
in givin~ treatments. In this connection, see :

Waddell v. Woods, 158 Kans. 469; 148 P. (2d)
1016, 152 A. L:. R. 629.
Also

Gray v. McLaughlin (Ark.) 179' S. W. (2d) 686;
Ragin v. Zimmerman, 206 Cal. 72:3, 276 P. 107;
Holcombe v. Magee, 21'7 Ill. App. 272.
The opinion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could
be invoked in an action where a patient sought recovery for
burns allegedly received when being treated by his physician
with an X-ray machine was expressed in Johnson v. Marshall, 241 Ill. App. 80. There the court said:
"The X-ray was under the exclusive control. of
the defendant, and there is evidence that the injury
to the plaintiff is not a necessary result of a treatment by an X-ray machine. While the evidence is not
as conclusive as it might be, yet, we are of the opinion that the testimony is to the effect that the result
that followed the use of the X-ray is not a necessary
nor the known and usual result which follows an
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application of the character made by the use thereof
upon the plaintiff. More precisely the doctrine 'res
ipsa loquitur' asserts that whenever a thing which
produced an injury is shown to have been under the
control and management· of the defendant, and the
occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of events
does not happen if due care has been exercised, the
fact of injury itself will be deemed to afford sufficient evidence to support a recovery in the absence of
any explanation to support a recovery in the absence
of any explanation of the defendant tending to show
that the injury was not due to his want of care."
In the case at bar, it is admitted and undisputed that the
lamps which were used in treating the plaintiff were under
the exclusive control of the defendants. Plaintiff testified
that the defendant Zupo upon being shown plaintiff's ankle
stated that they had burned her and that they were sorry
and wanted to know if she would come back to their place
of business and see what they could do for her. The defendants, of course, denied that they ever made such a
statement to the plaintiff. Whether or not such a statement
was made was for the jury to decide. 'The trial court was
of the opinion that the jury could do ~othing more than
speculate as to the cause of plaintiff's injuries. How the
court could reach such a conclusion is difficult to see, in
view of plaintiff's testimony, the medical evidence, and the
admission of defendant Zupo, and the fact that the doctrine
of res ipsa applies in this case.
It is, of course, an elementary proposition Qf law that
liability for an injury cannot be predicated upon conjecture
or speculation. It must be based upon actual proof, both
of negligence and of a causal relation between that negli-
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gence and the injury sustained. The cause of an accident
may be said to be speculative when from a consideration of
all the facts it is as likely that it happened from one cause
as another.
See Frescoln v. Puget Sound Traction Co., 90 Wash. 59,
155 P. 395.
There is no evidence whatsoever in the case at bar to
indicate that the plaintiff's injury was from any other cause
than the treatment given her by defendants. Where is there
any evidence that plaintiff's injury was just as likely due
to sorne other cause than it was the treatment given her by
defendants? There is none. There was nothing for the jury
to speculate about; it was whether they would believe the
testirnony offered on behalf of plaintiff or that of defend. .
ants.
A case which in principle is on all fours with the case
at bar is the case of Zimmerman v. Auerbach, 81 Utah 5·54,
17 P. (.2d) 251. This was an action by plaintiff for injuries
to her caused by the negligence of defendant~s employee in
giving a permanent wave. Plaintiff testified in substance
that before giving the permanent wave treatment her hair
was examined by the operator who asked whether she had
ever used anything on her hair, to which she answered,
"Yes, I have used some peroxide on the back." The operator
stated that they would not take the responsibility of determining what sort of a permanent wave best suited her hair
and called the defendant, who after examination said her
hair would take any kind of wave that they had in the shop.
The operator then proceeded to give her hair a "Duart
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Wave'' and handed plaintiff a watch with instructions to
advise the operator at the end of five minutes after the
electric current was applied. After one or two minutes,
plaintiff complained of pain and that her head was being
burned, and the operator told her that she would have to
stand a little heat. Plaintiff again complained of burning,
but the operator did not turn off the electric current until
the expiration of the five minutes. After the electrical appliances were removed, the hair was discolored, streaked,
sticky, brittle and came out when touched. In order to present a respectable appearance plaintiff was compelled to
have her hair cut and to wear a wig until it grew out again;
that as a result of the treatment plaintiff's scalp was blis..
tered and she became sick and suffered physical pain and
mental distress.
The evidence showed that the injury was caused by the
use of the wrong chemical solution and the application of
heat for a longer time than appropriate for hair which had
been treated with a bleach solution. The treatment given
was that ordinarily given to natural hair. By the evidence
the issue was narrowed to the question of whether plaintiff
had told defendant that she had used peroxide in her hair.
Defendant's testimony was to the effect that plaintiff was
asked if she had used dyes, restoratives or tonics, and that
she said that she had not, and that she was then given the
treatment applicable to natural hair. This issue was submitted to the jury by appropriate instructions, There was
a verdict and judgment fo:r plaintiff.
It was the contention of the appellant that the injury
to plaintiff's hair and scalp was as -likely to have occurred
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from something other than the treatment given by defendant, and thus the jury would have to speculate with respect
to how the injury occurred. The court in considering this;
concluded that it was for the jury to determine whether or
not the defendant had been careless and negligent in the
treatment of plaintiff and that it was not speculative.
A reading of that case will indicate a fact situation very
similar to the case at bar.
An interesting Utah case which will throw much light
on the question involved in this case is_ the case of Peterson
v. Richards, 73 Utah 59~; 272 Pac. 2:29'. That was an action
by plaintiff against defendant to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff during the course of an operation being performed upon her by the defendant. The testimony showed that defendant was performing an abdominal
operation on plaintiff. After the operation and while plaintiff was coming out of the anesthetic, she complained of her
hand. Upon examination of plaintiff's hand, it was found
that the fingers had been smashed. Plaintiff's hand was in
perfect condition before entering the operating room. It
could have been smashed by the operating table or by the
bed upon which plaintiff was placed after leaving the operating room and which was manipulated up and down while
she was coming out of the anesthetic.
It was the plaintiff's contention that after she left the
hospital and consulted the defendant, that the defendant
admited to her and to her husband that he had injured
plaintiff's hand by crushing it in the crevices on the operating table. The defendant denied ever having made such
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an admission and demonstrated in court that her hand could
not possibly have been injured while on the operating table,
but that it was more likely to have happened in the manipulating of the hospital bed. The jury found for the plaintiff.
The defendant contended that the only way the jury could
find for the plaintfif was to speculate or conjecture as to
the cause of the injury. The court stated, however, that
the defendant did not by any direct or positive evidence
show that plaintiff's hand was injured by manipulating or
adjusting the bed, but sought such an inference to be deduced from the facts and circumstances proven by him and
from manipulations of the bed before the jury.
That is exactly the situation we have in the case .at bar.
Here plaintiff testified that the defendant admitted that
they had burned her. The defendants sought to prove by an
expert that the lamp in question could not possibly burn
anyone and thus, by inference, that plaintiff's injuries were
from some other cause. In this respect the case at bar is on
all fores with the above cited case.
In Peterson v. Richards (supra), the court stated that
admissions of matters of fact of a party are of such probative effect when adverse or disserving, and voluntarily made
as to make a prima facie case to the extent of the subject
matter of the admission, and to dispense with other proof
of the fact so admitted and is sufficient to support a finding of fact resting alone upon such extrajudicial admissionof a party.
It should be for the jury to det_ermine whether the defendant made such an admission or not.
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We respectfully submit that the court was clearly in
error in directing a verdict against the plaintiff. So far as
the evidence is concerned, plaintiff had never been burned,
or received any other injury to her ankle, other than a break
in it several years before. The only time that any heat or
other treatment was given to plaintiff1s ankle which could
possibly have burned the same and injured her was the
treatment given her at defendant's place of business.
'Tb say that the jury, if allowed to consider this case

would have to speculate as to the cause of plaintiff's injury,
is invading the province of the jury.
Respectfully submitted,

WIDLA RD HAN'SON,
1

STE·WAR'T M. HANSON,
Attorney$ for Appellant~
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